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PHYLLIS LANG,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.
J

liOIiKKT

I,\M1,

Defendanij

Case
No.
1 0225

SAMV^T T HARTER,
Intervenor-RespondenL

PETITION FOR REHEARIiM, ub
INTER VENOR-RESPONPF X T

TO Liir. nuAuiiAIJLh SUPREME COURT OF T11F
STATE OF UTAH:
The intervenor-respondent (properly designated
garnishee-respondent) above named respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing of the appeal
in the above entitled cause and in support of this petition
represents to the Court as follows:
1 "H , t.:;iM)ishee-respondent reserves his argued
position as to each '>p 'he points of appeal but ill this
petition n<l<lr<>ssos I•; M i - - -1 f solely to those features of the
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decision wherein it is believed by him that the Court
may be convinced its result is based upon the application
of incorrect legal principles.
2. Therefore this petition is devoted to convincing
the Honorable Court that it has erred in its determination
that the garnishee-respondent, an executor appointed by
the Superior Court of Orange County, California, is
subject to the orders and processes of courts of the
State of Utah in so far as the assets of the California
estate are concerned.
POINT 1
THE COURT DID NOT RULE ON THE MOTION
OF THE GARNISHEE-RESPONDENT TO STRIKE
CERTAIN IRRELEVANT AND EXTRANEOUS
MATTERS FROM THE RECORD ON APPEAL, THE
GARNISHEE-RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO A
RULING ON THIS MOTION.

Point I of the garnishee-respondent's chief brief on
appeal reads as follows:
.. •
"The motion of garnishee-respondent Carter,
Executor of the Estate of Robert Lang, deceased,
filed in this Court and cause to strike from the
record on appeal certain documents and papers
should be granted."
The Court's opinion entirely ignored garnishee-respondent's motion to strike certain irrelevant and extraneous
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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matters from the record on appeal. There is a definite
implication in the Court's opinion that the Court, notwithstanding the pendency of this motion before it, considered statements of the plaintiff-appellant contained
in these irrelevant and extraneous documents. Garnisheerespondent emphatically reasserts his argument in support of the striking of these documents from the record
on appeal. He respectfully requests the Court not only
to consider his motion but also to carefully read his
argument in support thereof. Unless there is a definitive
ruling on this motion it is most difficult to tell from the
opinion whether it is based only upon the facts set
forth in the legitimate and proper record on appeal or
whether the Court considered matters set forth in these
documents which have no relevancy to the legal issues
involved in this case.
POINT H
THE COURT HAS WHOLLY IGNORED THE FACT
THAT ALL LEGAL PROCESS IN THIS ACTION
RAN AGAINST CARTER IN HIS CAPACITY AS
CALIFORNIA EXECUTOR APPOINTED BY THE
CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT AND NOT
AGAINST CARTER AS AN INDIVIDUAL.
The Court uses this language to justify its decision:
"The ends of justice are not best served
by being unduly concerned with niceties as to
names or titles. To accomplish its objectives it is
often necessary to disregard technicalities of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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nomenclature and look to substance and to the
basic rights of the parties involved. In doing
so here, it will be seen that the fundamental facts
are that Mr. Carter, by whatever title he may be
addressed, was here in the state of Utah; that he
had in his possession here money which it had
been judicially determined belonged to Robert
Lang; and which had been ordered paid over to
the latter."
The disregard of what the Court designated as "technicalities of nomenclature" has resulted not only in a
miscarriage of justice in this particular case but has
also set a precedent which will be productive of vicious
litigation in the future. The garnishee-respondent (intervenor-respondent) repeats for the purpose of emphasis
the statement contained in his original brief in this
action:
"The copy of the writ of garnishment served
on 'Carter (R-l) was addressed to him in his
capacity as Executor. He answered the same in
his capacity as 'Executor of the Estate of John
Lang, deceased' ( E - l ) , and by his answers he
specifically declared that his possession of the
sum of $9,375.00 was in his role as Executor and
not as an individual. The garnishee judgment
(R-4) was against 'Samuel J. Carter as Executor
of the Estate of John Lang, deceased'; it was not
against 'Carter as an individual. The garnishee
execution (R-5) based on said garnishee judgment
was against Carter as Executor. The notice of
appeal in this action (R-17) is designated the
order appealed from as 'setting aside, annulling
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and declaring void that certain garnishee judgment rendered in this action on the 28th day of
February, 1964, against Samuel J. Carter, Executor of the Estate of John Lang and in favor
of plaintiff above named' (B-17)." (Italics supplied). (Page 16).
The disregard by the Court of the actualities in this
case and the attempt to serve the "ends of justice" denies
all principles of the judicial process. I t is simply the
adoption of the assertion by plaintiff-appellant found
at the top of page 12 of her brief to the effect that "the
proceeding is not against Mr. Carter in his representative
capacity as the Executor of the Estate of John Lang
but rather in his capacity as a personal debtor to the
defendant. In the subject case no attempt is being made
to substitute Mr. Carter as a party for the deceased."
This quoted assertion of the plaintiff-appellant is not
supported by the record on appeal, and the Court in its
opinion made itself a party to this misstatement of
the plaintiff-appellant. The Court has literally taken
an eraser in hand and erased from the writ of garnishment, the answer of the garnishee-appellant, the garnishee
judgment and the garnishee execution the words "Samuel
J. Carter as Executor of the Estate of John Lang,
deceased" and substituted simply the name "Samuel J.
Carter." By this action it has made Mr. Carter the
holder and possessor of certain funds, and charges Mr.
Carter individually and personally with a liability and
responsibility which the record on appeal cannot and
does not support.
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The argument of the Court as found in the above
quotation from its opinion will permit it in any case
to recast the facts in order to achieve what it considers
"the ends of justice." The effect of such judicial action
will be to destroy all symmetry of the judicial process
and render judicial precedents valueless in the determination of the rule of law governing a given situation.
The observance by the Court of the actual facts of this
case as disclosed by the record on appeal would not
have permitted it to reverse the action of the Trial Court.
POINT ffl
THE DECISION IN THE INSTANT CASE IS DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO THE DECISION IN
WILCOX VS. DISTRICT COURT, AND HAS RESULTED IN PRODUCING CONFUSION AND UNCERTAINTY WHICH IN THE FUTURE WILL
SPELL DIFFICULTIES FOR THE COURT ITSELF
AND RENDER PROBATE ADMINISTRATION UNCERTAIN.

The Court attempts in Footnote 5 to distinguish
Wilcox vs. District Court, 2 Utah (2d), 227, 272 Pac.(2d),
157, by asserting that in Wilcox there was "the attempt
to have the Utah Court assert jurisdiction over a California appointed executrix who was in California so
that the persons and the assets were in California."
Chief Justice Henriod in his dissenting opinion in this
case emphatically denies this interpretaton of Wilcox.
The garnishee-respondent supports the Chief Justice in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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this assertion. The decision simply holds that "No action
can be maintained against any administrator outside
the state of his appointment upon a claim against the
estate of decedent." In Wilcox, an attempt was made
to cause the California executrix to be substituted as a
defendant in a divorce action instituted in Utah, and
to cause judgment to be entered against her as such
for the amount found due for the unpaid support money.
It was an active attempt to subject a California executrix
to the processes of the Utah Court, just as in this case
the plaintiff-appellant has attempted to subject the 'California executor to the garnishment processes of '
Utah Court. _. r ilcox remains the law in Utah, then
the decision of the Court in the instant action is wrong.
If the decision in the instant case is allowed to stand
as the law of the State of Utah, then the Court should
forthrightly and directly overrule Wilcox and announce
that in Utah a foreign executor and administrator may
be sued if the process server can catch him in the State
of Utah. The rule of Wilcox and the rule announced in
the instant case are in direct conflict. The Court must
either denounce Wilcox as bad law or grant this petition
for rehearing.
It is easy to imagine situations which are certain
to arise if foreign executors and administrators can be
sued in Utah. Let us take this example: "X" is appointed
the executor of the estate of "Y", a California resident,
by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California.
There is an individual residing at St. George, Utah,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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who asserts that "Y" was indebted to him at the time
of his death. "X", while passing through St. George
on his way to Zion Park, is served by the sheriff of
Washington County with summons and complaint in an
action instituted in the District 'Court of Washington
County against "X" as executor by the alleged Utah
creditor. The creditor had theretofore presented his
claim to "X" as executor and it had been denied ^payment.
The Superior 'Court, sitting in probate, had approved
the action of the executor. The answer to the legal problem presented by this hypothetical set of facts if solved
by the application of the rule announced in the instant
case produces a situation which is intolerable. "X", as
executor, is answerable to the Superior Court of California and yet he is compelled because of the rule announced in the instant case to employ counsel and defend
himself as 'California executor in a Utah court on a claim
which has been denied by a California court. Assume further that the Utah creditor secures a judgment of the Utah
court against "X" as executor. Here we have a situation
where the denial of the claim was approved by the California court sitting in probate but which is the subject of a
Utah judgment. There is then and there injected into
the situation the question as to whether or not the Utah
judgment is entitled to the protection of the "full faith
and credit" clause of the Federal 'Constitution (Article
IV, Section I, Constitution of the United States of America). There is further serious constitutional question
created by this situation as to whether or not the Utah
judgment is void under the Fourteenth Amendment to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Federal Constitution because of lack of due process
of law. The rule as announced by the Court in the instant
case has buried in it these fundamental problems of law
under the Federal Constitution. (McMaster v. Gould, 239
N. Y. 606,147 N.E. 214; Helme v. Buckelew, 229 N.Y. 363,
128 N.E. 216.)
The garnishee-respondent repeats his declaration
contained in his original brief that Carter was biefore the
District Court
"as Executor of the Lang Estate and not as an individual. He is before this Court in his role as executor and not as an individual. The plaintiffappellant by her own action chose to bring Carter
before the Court in his representative capacity,
and not as an individual." (Pages 16-17, Brief of
Garnishee-Bespondent.)
Further, the garnishee-respondent repeats and reemphasizes this statement contained in his original Brief:
"The funds held by Carter as Executor until
actually paid by him to the person entitled thereto
remained part of the assets of the 'California
estate and were under the jurisdiction and protection of the Orange County Superior Court. While
Carter acknowledged in his garnishment answer
that he was indebted as executor to J. Robert
Lang, this acknowledgment was simply his statement of an indebtedness due from the California
executor to Lang. Unless and until Carter as
executor paid these funds to Lang they remained
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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part of the California estate. There had been no
segregation of the same from the general assets
of the estate. These funds did not arise from
a distribution of the California estate to the devisees or legatees of John Lang, deceased. Nothing in the record on appeal denies that these funds,
together with all other assets of the estate were
within the State of 'California and not within the
jurisdiction of the Utah courts. The consequence
is that no judgment of a Utah court could affect
this res which was beyond its jurisdiction." Pages
24-25, Brief of Cirarnishee-Respondent).
The questions under the Federal Constitution as
demonstrated by the hypothetical case above set forth
exist with respect to the judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellant against 'Carter as California executor of
the estate of John Lang, deceased. Carter as executor
is answerable to the Superior 'Court of Orange County,
California. Must the California Superior Court honor
this judgment against Carter as executor under the "full
faith and credit" clause of the federal Constitution, or is
the judgment based on such a frail foundation that it
is void under the Fourteenth Amendment and need not
be recognized by the California court? It is repeated
again that these funds were not funds distributed to J.
Robert Lang under a decree of distribution of the California court. Carter's answer as garnishee declared that
he held funds as executor of the estate of John Lang,
deceased, in the Superior Court of California in and for
the 'County of Orange, and that he had in his possession
$9,375.00 owing to defendant in settlement of an action
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"brought against me as such executor by defendant ayid
others." These funds were the fruit of litigation and
were not funds given by the testator, John Lang, to his
son. They remained part of the California assets until
paid by Carter as executor to Lang. Regardless of where
the funds were deposited Carter's primary responsibility
to account for same was and is to the 'California court,
and yet this Court in the instant case requires Carter
as executor to pay them to the plaintiff-appellant. There
is a direct conflict of jurisdiction, and the validity of
this garnishee judgment is vitiated by the provisions of
the Federal Constitution above cited.

POINT IV
THE DOCTRINE OF BRISTOL VS. BRENT (38
UTAH 58; 110 PAC. 356) WAS ENTIRELY IGNORED BY THE COURT IN ITS DECISION. THIS DOCTRINE SUSTAINS THE DISTRICT COURT IN
HOLDING THE GARNISHEE JUDGMENT VOID.

Attention is invited to the quotation from the decision in Bristol vs. Brent found at pages 25 and 26 of
the garnishee-respondents original brief. The Court,
in order to sustain its ruling in this case, must overrule
Bristol vs. Brent and not ignore it. J. Robert Lang
could not have sued Carter as California executor of
the estate of John Lang, deceased, in the District Court
of Salt Lake County, Utah, if the Court considers that
Wilcox vs. District Court still declares the law in Utah.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Since J. Robert Lang could not have sued 'Carter in the
Utah court, the plaintiff-appellant cannot secure a garnishee judgment against Carter as executor in an action
against said J. Robert Lang.
W H E R E F O R E , the garnishee-respondent respectfully prays the Honorable Court for relief as follows:
1. That the Honorable Court grant the garnisheerespondent a rehearing in the above entitled action, and
that upon said rehearing the judgment of the District
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, in this action be
affirmed;
2. That in the event the Honorable Court denies the
garnishee-respondent a rehearing in this action that it
particularly consider the points raised by the garnisheerespondent in this petition for rehearing with respect
to the application of the "full faith and credit" clause
of the Federal Constitution and the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution to
the judgment against the garnishee-respondent in favor
of the plaintiff-appellant, and that to evidence said consideration by the Court of the constitutional questions
thus raised as a result of said consideration that it declare
for the purpose of the record that it considered these
Federal constitutional questions in denying this petition
for rehearing, and that the Federal constitutional questions were the basis of its denial of this petition rather
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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than any rule of State law. And the garnishee-respondent
will forever pray.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANKLIN RITER
FRED L. FINLINSON
Attorneys for Garnishee-Respondent
(Intervenor-Respondent)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, FRANKLIN RITER, one of the attorneys for
the Intervenor - Respondent (Garnishee - Respondent),
hereby certify that on t h e ^ ^ ^ l - d a y of July, 1965, three
copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were
mailed by me to Dudley M. Amos, attorney for PlaintiffAppellant; said copies of said Petition were inclosed
in an envelope with postage prepaid, addressed to said
Amoss at 974 East 3 j ^ South Street, j§j$t» Lake City,
Utah.
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